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TO KNOCK OR NOT TO KNOCK? NO-KNOCK 
WARRANTS AND CONFRONTATIONAL 
POLICING 
BY BRIAN DOLAN† 
Police are left to instigate violence as a means of resolving any 
social deadlock, to add violence to situations they feel to be 
ambiguous. But if we can really see, and see through, police, we 
may see that this becomes a way of injecting testing violence [or 
domination] into the heart of society in a public way. Police test 
what violence we, as citizens, will allow, and against whom.  
Small comfort, perhaps, since there is no guarantee that we will 
oppose the wicked things that police may show us. Our 
neighbors may support that wickedness.  We may have no idea 
how to fix it.  Still, police violence differs from forms of violence 
and domination that have no visible presence or public check.  
The police measure out in public what the society will tolerate, 
even to our shame.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Around 4 a.m. on December 5, 2017, a team of New York 
City police officers, armed with a no-knock search warrant, broke 
down ninety-two year-old Natalio Conde’s front door without 
warning and began methodically searching his Bronx 
apartment.2  Waking to the sound of people moving around his 
home, Mr. Conde, in poor health and in no condition to tussle 
 
† J.D. 2019, St. John’s University School of Law. Many thanks are due to 
Professor Kate Levine, who provided indispensable guidance and encouragement 
throughout the writing process, as well as  helpful feedback on early drafts. The 
author would also like to thank the editorial board and staff members of the St. 
John’s Law Review for their hard work towards getting this piece ready for 
publication.  
1 Mark Greif, Seeing Through Police, N+1 FOUNDATION, Spring 2015, 
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-22/police/seeing-through-police/ (second emphasis 
added). 
2 James C. McKinley Jr., After Police Raids Kills Man, 69, Family Asks Why 
Trigger Was Pulled, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
12/13/nyregion/nypd-police-shooting-bronx-mario-sanabria-lawsuit.html?smid=tw-
share&_r=1&mtrref=t.co. 
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with intruders, became frightened and remained in bed, 
motionless.3  From his bed, Mr. Conde saw a man pushing his 
brother-in-law, 69-year-old Mario Sanabria, into the room.4  Mr. 
Conde heard his brother-in-law ask, “What’s happening?” and 
then heard a shot.5  The shot hit Mr. Sanabria in the chest and 
killed him.6 
A few months earlier, during the predawn hours of July 26, 
2017, federal agents, armed with a no-knock search warrant, 
picked the lock on the front door of former Trump campaign 
chairman Paul Manafort’s home in Alexandria, Virginia, and 
raided the house.7  In the wake of the raid, a number of 
commentators expressed concern about the use of no-knock 
warrants in connection with white-collar investigations.8  Since 
the Manafort raid, these commentators have described no-knock 
warrants as a “shock and awe” tactic,9 as a tool that strikes 
terror in people’s hearts,10 and as more appropriate for going 
after organized crime syndicates than white-collar criminals.11 
Echoing these sentiments, Jonathan Turley, a professor at 
George Washington University Law School, described the 
Manafort raid as “gratuitous” and “excessive,” and stated that 
“no-knock warrants were designed primarily for dangerous drug 
dealers.”12  Moreover, he went on to say, “what did they think he 
 
3 Id. 
4 Id. The police alleged that Sanabria confronted them with a machete; Mr. 
Conde said that he did not see a machete in Sanabria’s hand. Id. There was a 
machete in the apartment, but Mr. Conde said it was a souvenir that belonged to 
him, and that he did not think Sanabria knew it was there. Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. The police were looking for Mario Sanabria’s nephew, Miguel Conde, and 
had information that there was a gun and narcotics in the apartment. Id. Miguel 
Conde had not lived in the apartment for several months, and aside from the stub of 
a marijuana cigarette and a pocketknife, the police found no weapons or narcotics. 
Id. 
7 Sharon LaFraniere et al., With a Search Warrant and a Threatened 
Indictment, Mueller’s Inquiry Sets a Tone, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 18, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/mueller-russia-investigation.html?_r=0. 
8 Carol D. Leonnig et al., FBI Conducted Predawn Raid of Former Trump 
Campaign Chairman Manafort’s Home, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-conducted-predawn-raid-of-former-trump-
campaign-chairman-manaforts-home/2017/08/09/5879fa9c-7c45-11e7-9d08-
b79f191668ed_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.0991546db134. 
9 Id. 
10 LaFraniere et al., supra note 7. 
11 Id. 
12 Law Scholar Says Manafort No-Knock Warrant ‘Excessive’, MSNBC, 
http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/law-scholar-says-manafort-no-knock-
warrant-excessive-1022455363688. 
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was going to do? Try to flush his laptop down the toilet or meet 
them at the door with a Glock?”13  Others expressed the belief 
that obtaining a no-knock search warrant is particularly difficult 
and that magistrates subject search warrant applications to a 
great deal of scrutiny.14  Finally, some suggested that no-knock 
warrants are typically only used in the most serious criminal 
investigations.15 
It is puzzling that the use of a no-knock warrant against 
Manafort drew such condemnation because the only remarkable 
thing about the raid is how smoothly it went.  There was no 
property damage, nobody was injured or killed, and no shots 
were fired.16  While the relatively tame Manafort raid garnered 
widespread attention from various corners of the legal 
profession17—no doubt because Manafort is a powerful, 
well-connected member of the Washington establishment—the 
Conde raid primarily drew condemnation from family members 
of the victim.18 
The above comments thus raise several issues regarding the 
use of no-knock search warrants, which this Note discusses in 
detail.  First, no-knock warrants are, in general, gratuitous and 
excessive, regardless of whether the target of the search is a 
member of our society’s elite class like Manafort, or is an 
ordinary citizen like Conde, because their execution involves a 
substantial risk of violence to both homeowners and law 
enforcement.19  Between 2010 and 2016, at least ninety-four 
people died during the execution of no-knock search warrants, 
 
13 Id. 
14 Radley Balko, No-Knock Raids Like the One Against Paul Manafort are More 
Common Than You Think, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/10/no-knock-raids-like-the-one-against-paul-
manafort-are-more-common-than-you-think/?utm_term=.f49b264d28b4 [hereinafter 
Balko, No-Knock Raids]  (quoting author and legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin, who said, 
“Magistrate judges don’t give authorizations for searches of people’s homes lightly. I 
mean, this is a big deal.”); see also Leonnig et al., supra note 8 (“A federal judge 
signing this warrant would demand persuasive evidence of probable cause that a 
serious crime has been committed.”). 
15 Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Blumenthal). 
16 Compare LaFraniere et al., supra note 7, with McKinley Jr., supra note 2. 
17 Supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
18 McKinley Jr., supra note 2 (“It was an injustice,” his sister said). 
19 McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(describing forcible entry without announcement as “a method of law enforcement so 
reckless and so fraught with danger and discredit to the law enforcement agencies 
themselves”). 
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thirteen of whom were police officers.20  Nevertheless, the 
comments above suggest no-knock warrants are only gratuitous 
and excessive when used against well-heeled individuals 
suspected of white-collar crimes, such as Manafort, but that the 
risks are justified when investigating drug dealers and other 
more “dangerous” criminals.  Second, Professor Turley’s 
comments directly conflate drug dealers with violence and 
danger to police—a relationship that is not supported by 
empirical evidence.21  Despite the lack of empirical support, the 
presumption that drugs and violence are directly related is 
deeply rooted in our society,22 and this partially explains why 
no-knock warrants are frequently used when police search for 
drugs.23  Finally, the above comments suggest that applications 
for no-knock warrants are put under much greater judicial 
scrutiny than is actually the case.24 
 
20 Kevin Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids Leave a Trail of Blood, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entry-
warrant-drug-raid.html [hereinafter Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids]. 
21 Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 278–279 (2015) 
(discussing the lack of empirical evidence of a direct relationship between drugs and 
violence, and summarizing research suggesting that drug-related violence is more 
closely related to other factors such as environment, personality, or age). 
22 Id. at 246–252, 255–264 (describing politicians’ “War on Drugs” rhetoric and 
its effect on public perception of linking drugs and violence, and also discussing case 
law and statutes that rely on the perceived link between drugs and violence). 
23 See id. at 267–268 (noting that, in the context of no-knock warrants, courts 
readily assume officer safety is threatened in drug cases); Radley Balko, Opinion, 
Little Rock’s Dangerous and Illegal Drug War, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/10/14/little-rocks-
dangerous-and-illegal-drug-war/?utm_term=.41d32be5732c [hereinafter Balko, Little 
Rock’s Drug War] (“[T]he narcotics unit appears to be routinely violating the Fourth 
Amendment by serving nearly all of its warrants with no-knock raids.”); AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICAN POLICING 33 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU, WAR COMES HOME] (reporting 
findings that “[n]o-knock warrants were used (or probably used) in about 60 percent 
of incidents in which SWAT teams were searching for drugs . . . .”); Peter B. Kraska 
& Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of 
Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 8 n.8 (1997) (“Courts are more than willing to 
issue ‘no-knock if necessary’ warrants, particularly in cases characterized as drug-
related.” (quoting Moss v. City of Colorado Springs, 871 F.2d 112, 133 (10th Cir. 
1989)). 
24 Richard Van Duizend, L. Paul Sutton, Charlotte A. Carter, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 26-27 (1984) (“The average length of the magisterial 
review in the proceedings we observed was two minutes and forty-eight seconds. The 
median time was two minutes and twelve seconds[,]” and ten percent were approved 
in less than a minute. In addition, of the proceedings observed, only eight percent of 
warrant applications were denied.); Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 
(“[The narcotics unit is] asking for no-knock warrants without demonstrating why 
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This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I begins by 
explaining what no-knock warrants are and why they are used.  
Part I then addresses recent state legislative efforts to reform 
no-knock warrant use and argues that these efforts, however 
well-intentioned, are insufficient.  Part I will also provide a brief 
history of how no-knock warrant use developed and gives an 
overview of the current status of state law regarding no-knock 
warrants.  Part II argues that, contrary to the arguments of 
no-knock proponents, elimination of no-knock warrants and strict 
adherence to the knock-and-announce requirement is a more 
effective way to ensure the safety of both law enforcement 
officers and civilians.  Part III proposes comprehensive 
legislation that state legislatures can adopt to protect the safety 
of law enforcement officers and civilians and to ensure that 
citizens’ civil liberties are respected.  Part III argues that the 
most effective solution is for states to prohibit the use of no-knock 
warrants, require execution of traditional search warrants 
during daylight hours, and apply the exclusionary rule to 
knock-and-announce violations.25 
I. NO-KNOCK WARRANT USE BY STATE & LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. What are No-Knock Warrants and Why are They Used? 
A no-knock search warrant authorizes the executing officer’s 
entrance of premises to be searched without giving notice of his 
authority and purpose, usually upon reasonable suspicion that 
knocking and announcing would be dangerous or would result in 
the destruction of evidence.26  No-knock warrants differ from 
 
each suspect merits a no-knock entry, as required by federal law. Worse yet, Little 
Rock judges are then signing off on these warrants.”); see also Jessica Miller & 
Aubrey Wieber, Warrants Approved in Just Minutes: Are Utah Judges Really 
Reading Them Before Signing Off?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/01/14/warrants-approved-in-just-minutes-are-
utah-judges-really-reading-them-before-signing-off/; Editorial, Getting a Warrant 
Should Be Harder Than It Is, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/opinion/editorial/2018/01/16/tribune-editorial-getting-a-
warrant-should-be-harder-than-it-is/ [hereinafter Editorial, Getting a Warrant].  
25 See infra Part III. 
26 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35(4)(b) (McKinney 2017). See also 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (“In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ 
entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing 
their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or 
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traditional search warrants because they authorize law 
enforcement to dispense with the common-law 
“knock-and-announce” requirement. The knock-and-announce 
requirement mandates that, before forcibly entering a private 
residence to execute a search warrant, police must provide prior 
notice of their authority and purpose, usually by knocking on the 
door and announcing that they are police who are present to 
execute a search warrant.27 Historically, the knock-and-announce 
requirement was viewed as an indispensable protection for both 
citizens and police, for homeowners against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,28 and for law enforcement officers against 
fearful homeowners who might mistake them for burglars or 
prowlers.29  Other concerns underlying the knock-and-announce 
requirement include protecting the individual’s right to privacy, 
giving the homeowner the chance to redirect police officers at the 
wrong address in cases of mistaken identity,30 providing an 
opportunity for persons to comply with the law, avoiding property 
damage,31 and giving people the chance to put on clothes or get 
out of bed.32 
 
that it would inhibit the effective investigation of crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence.”). 
27 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (holding that “petitioner 
could not be lawfully arrested in his home by officers breaking in without first giving 
him notice of their authority and purpose”). The knock-and-announce requirement 
has a long, established history at common law, both in the United States and in 
England, and dates back to the thirteenth century. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 605–06 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 
(1995) (holding that the principle of announcement is an element of the 
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment); Ker v. State of California, 
374 U.S. 23, 54-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(finding that “no English decision which clearly recognizes any exception to the 
requirement that the police first give notice of their authority and purpose before 
forcibly entering a home”). The requirement is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929. 
29 Miller, 357 U.S. at 313 n.12; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,  
460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
30 Ker, 374 U.S. at 57–58; Craig Hemmens & Chris Mathias, United States v. 
Banks: The “Knock-and-Announce” Rule Returns to the Supreme Court, 41 IDAHO L. 
REV. 1, 7–8 (2004). 
31 Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5. 
32 Id.; see also Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A 
New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 
690–691 (1993) (describing four important purposes served by the knock-and-
announce rule); Hemmens & Mathias, supra note 30, at 8. 
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B. Where We Are Now: State-Level Efforts to Reform No-Knock 
Warrant Use 
In recent years, there has been growing public recognition 
that no-knock raids are an unnecessarily aggressive and 
intrusive law enforcement practice,33 and a couple of states, most 
notably Utah and Georgia, have made legislative efforts to 
address these concerns.34  For example, a pair of Georgia bills 
proposed in 2015 would have required execution of no-knock 
warrants between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. and would have required a 
higher showing of proof before such warrants could be issued.35  
In addition, the legislation would have required police to have an 
“operational plan” for executing no-knock warrants and create a 
training program related to applying for and executing no-knock 
warrants.36 
 
33 See, e.g., Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20; McKinley, supra note 
2; Editorial, Risks Often Outweigh Benefits of No-Knock Search Warrants, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-
risks-often-outweight-benefits-of-no-knock-search-warrants/article_6f6219d1-defe-
57b0-8ea0-a8668159b88a.html; Editorial, State Should Address No-Knock Raids, 
CONCORD MONITOR (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.concordmonitor.com/The-danger-of-
no-knock-raids-8822918; Dave Faherty, Channel 9 Investigates Controversial Use of 
No-Knock Search Warrants, W-SOC TV (May 1, 2017), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/ 
9-investigates/channel-9-investigates-controversial-use-of-no-knock-search-warrants 
/518161168; Editorial, Our View: Review Police Raids, OGDEN STANDARD-EXAMINER 
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/08/05/our-view-review-police-
raids; David Koon, Shot in the Dark, ARKANSAS TIMES (Apr. 24, 2008), 
https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/shot-in-the-dark/Content?oid=948430. 
34 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210(8) ( West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8 (3) 
(West 2015); S.B. 45, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 56, 153rd Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); S.B. 94, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017). 
Maryland is considering legislation designed to increase transparency regarding 
no-knock warrant use. See Radley Balko, Maryland Legislature Mulls New SWAT 
Transparency Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-watch/wp/2015/03/19/maryland-legislature-mulls-new-swat-transparency-
bill/ (noting that the Maryland legislature is currently considering a bill that would 
require state and local law enforcement agencies to report “the legal authority, 
including type of warrant, if any, for each activation and deployment [of a tactical 
team]”). 
35 S.B. 45, No. LC 29 6124, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 56, 
No. LC 29 6134, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
36 S.B. 45, No. LC 29 6124, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 56, 
No. LC 29 6134, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). The Georgia bills did not 
pass but have since been reintroduced. S.B. 94, No. LC 29 7163, 154th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017). However, the revised bill only raises the standard of proof for 
obtaining a no-knock warrant to probable cause; it does not require execution of 
no-knock between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Id. 
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Utah, for its part, amended its search warrant statute by 
prohibiting no-knock warrants when the only crime suspected is 
drug use, drug possession, or possession of drug paraphernalia.37  
Utah also enacted a statute in 2014 that set forth reporting 
requirements regarding the use of tactical groups and forcible 
entry to execute search warrants, making Utah the only state 
with a law requiring all law enforcement agencies to report all 
instances of forced entry into a private residence.38  That statute 
also requires law enforcement agencies to report the type of 
warrant obtained and the name of the magistrate who authorized 
the warrant, among other information, each time a tactical group 
is deployed or police officers use forcible entry.39 
While these legislative efforts are laudable, they miss the 
mark and fail to adequately respond to concerns about no-knock 
warrants in ways that will make a practical difference for 
civilians and law enforcement officers.  For instance, the Georgia 
proposals would have been far more meaningful if they required 
the execution of traditional search warrants between 6 a.m. and 
10 p.m. because that would increase the likelihood that residents 
actually hear the police when they knock and announce their 
presence, giving residents a real opportunity to answer the door 
and comply.40  On the other hand, requiring execution of no-
knock warrants between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. misses the point 
entirely.  Indeed, it is not farfetched to imagine that this 
 
37 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210(8) (West 2018). Utah Representative Marc 
Roberts plans to introduce H.B. 83 in 2018, which would require judges to place no-
knock warrant applications under stricter scrutiny. Jessica Miller & Aubrey Wieber, 
Utah Cops Would Have to Answer More Questions Before Getting a No-Knock 
Warrant, Under New Proposal, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/01/14/utah-cops-would-have-to-answer-more-
questions-before-getting-a-no-knock-warrant-under-new-proposal/. The bill would 
also prohibit using force to enter a home if the suspect is only accused of possession 
with the intent to distribute, but would still allow for forcible entry upon a showing 
of probable cause that a suspect was actually selling drugs. Id. 
38 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8.5 ( West 2014); Radley Balko, Data Show That in 
Utah, SWAT-Style Tactics Are Overwhelmingly Used to Serve Drug Warrants, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/08/ 
17/data-show-that-in-utah-swat-style-tactics-are-overwhelmingly-used-to-serve-
drug-warrants/?utm_term=.990b2cf8005a [hereinafter Balko, Utah Data]. 
39 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8.5 (West 2014). 
40 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38 (noting that knock-and-announce raids at 
night are, in effect, indistinguishable from no-knock raids); see also Jacob Sullum, 
Hasty Drug Warriors Are a Menace, REASON (Jan. 28, 2015), http://reason.com/ 
archives/2015/01/28/hasty-drug-warriors-are-a-menace (arguing that the proposed 
Georgia legislation might not have prevented the tragedy that inspired its 
introduction). 
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requirement could actually increase the risk of violent 
confrontation because homeowners are more likely to be alert 
and awake.  Such a requirement also makes little difference for 
people who sleep past 6 a.m. or go to sleep before 10 p.m.—who 
are just as likely to be asleep as others would be in the middle of 
the night.41 
Reform efforts calling for increased training and operational 
planning are sound in theory, but it is unlikely that any amount 
of training and operational planning can eliminate the potential 
for violent confrontations when police crash through the front 
door of private residences and frighten the people inside.42  The 
reporting and transparency requirements are a welcome 
development, but eliminating the use of no-knock warrants 
would be a far more helpful measure than simply gathering data 
on their use. 
One other noteworthy development out of Utah is a bill 
introduced in the House earlier this year.  The bill would require 
that, before seeking a warrant, a supervisory official perform an 
independent risk assessment using the officer’s affidavit and 
other relevant information to “evaluate the totality of the 
circumstances and ensure reasonable intelligence gathering 
efforts have been made.”43  The bill would also require that the 
relied-upon affidavit describe all investigative activities 
undertaken to ensure that the correct address is identified and 
that potential harm to innocent third-parties, the property, and 
the officers is minimized.44 
The Utah Legislature’s decision to prohibit no-knock 
warrants in drug possession cases is the most significant of the 
reform efforts to date.  No-knock warrants have become a regular 
feature of serious and not-so-serious drug investigations alike.45  
However, this reform falls short because it still leaves open the 
possibility that no-knock warrants will be used against those 
 
41 See, e.g., Jessica Miller, Police Detail What Went Wrong in Fatal Shootout 
with Matthew David Stewart, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jul. 17, 2014), 
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=58190599&itype=CMSID [hereinafter Miller, 
Fatal Shootout] (describing violent confrontation resulting from no-knock warrant 
executed around 8:30 p.m. while suspect, who worked the overnight shift, was 
sleeping). 
42 See infra Section II.A. 
43 H.B. 83, 2018 Leg., 62nd Sess. (Utah 2018). 
44 Id. 
45 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38; see also sources cited supra note 23; Sack, 
Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20; Koon, supra note 33; Miller, Fatal 
Shootout, supra note 41. 
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suspected of selling drugs, even if they are small-time, as well as 
scores of other nonviolent suspects.46  There is grave danger to 
both civilians and police officers whenever no-knock entries are 
executed.47  While more transparency is generally welcomed in 
the realm of policing and increased training is a step in the right 
direction, neither of these solutions addresses the reality that 
no-knock warrants are inherently dangerous for both police and 
civilians.  No amount of after-the-fact review can undo the 
damage occasioned by no-knock raids that go sideways. 
If states wish to create meaningful reform, state legislatures 
should prohibit no-knock warrants, mandate strict compliance 
with the knock-and-announce requirement, require execution of 
traditional search warrants during daylight hours, and authorize 
application of the exclusionary rule for knock-and-announce 
violations.48  Unfortunately, legislative efforts thus far have been 
largely reactive and state legislators have been too reluctant to 
take action until tragedy strikes.49  It is imperative that states 
begin to take proactive legislative measures to rein in the use of 
no-knock warrants. 
 
46 See, e.g., Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 (reporting use of no-
knock warrants in investigations of illegal poker games, brewing moonshine, and 
neglecting pets); Sarah Fenske, City to Change “Nuisance Property” Policy After No-
Knock Raid on Wrong House, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.river 
fronttimes.com/newsblog/2018/08/20/city-to-change-nuisance-property-policy-after-
no-knock-raid-on-wrong-house (describing St. Louis’s “Project 87,” which used no-
knock warrants to enter “nuisance properties,” whose residents were typically cited 
for minor code violations). 
47 See infra Part II.A. 
48 See infra Part III. 
49 The Georgia bills were precipitated by a botched raid in which a flash-bang 
grenade was thrown into the crib of a nineteen-month-old infant, severely injuring 
him and requiring him to be placed in a medically induced coma. Jon Richards, HB 
56 Hopes to Regulate No-Knock Warrants, PEACH PUNDIT (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.peachpundit.com/2015/02/26/hb-56-hopes-to-regulate-no-knock-
warrants/; Alecia Phonesavanh, A SWAT Team Blew a Hole in my 2-Year-Old Son, 
SALON (Jun. 24, 2014) https://www.salon.com/2014/06/24/a_swat_team_blew_a_ 
hole_in_my_2_year_old_son/. The Utah amendments and statutes were largely a 
response to a 2012 incident in Ogden, Utah, during which one officer was killed and 
five others were wounded while executing a no-knock warrant on the home of a 
small-time marijuana grower named Matthew David Stewart, a military veteran 
suffering from PTSD, who did not even sell his product. Radley Balko, How a Drug 
Raid Gone Wrong Sparked a Call for Change in the Unlikeliest State in the Nation, 
HUFFINGTON. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/24/ 
utah-drug-raid-matthew-david-stewart_n_4138252.html. See also Miller, Fatal 
Shootout, supra note 41. 
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C. The Early Federal Experience with No-Knock Warrants 
The origins of no-knock warrants can be traced to the Nixon 
administration and the early days of the War on Drugs.50  In 
1970, Congress authorized federal magistrates to issue no-knock 
warrants to federal law enforcement officers.  According to 
proponents, strict adherence to the knock-and-announce rule 
allowed drug dealers to destroy evidence and denied police the 
element of surprise, thereby increasing the danger officers face 
when executing search warrants in drug investigations.51  
However, no-knock warrants proved so problematic that 
Congress repealed the statute authorizing their use four years 
later based on extensive newspaper reporting describing 
mistaken, violent, and often illegal raids carried out by law 
enforcement officers searching for drugs.52  This is unsurprising, 
since the use of no-knock warrants, like the War on Drugs itself, 
was always more about politics than effectiveness.53  However, a 
number of War on Drugs policies created significant incentives 
for state and local law enforcement to participate in counter-drug 
activities54 and drastically increased the number of state and 
local police departments with SWAT teams and similar 
paramilitary-style units.55  The rise of SWAT teams and similar 
 
50 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, § 509, 84 Stat. 1236, 1274, (previously codified at 21 U.S.C. § 879(b) (1970)). 
See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S 
POLICE FORCES 83–84, 90 (2014) [hereinafter BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP]; 
DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF 
FAILURE 6–7 (1996). 
51 Garcia, supra note 32, at 703. 
52 Id. at 705. 
53 BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP, supra note 50, at 104–05 (discussing the 
creation of a new federal agency “to show off the . . . administration’s showpiece 
crime tools,” such as no-knock raids, and “generate empty but impressive-sounding 
arrest statistics Nixon could tout”). See also generally BAUM, supra note 50. 
54 See generally BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP, supra note 51, at 157. See 
also, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. 
L. 101–189, § 1208 (1989) (authorizing transfer of military hardware from the 
Department of Defense to federal and state agencies for use in counter-drug 
activities); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. 104–
201, 110 Stat. 2422, § 1033 (1996). President Barack Obama attempted to rein in 
this program, albeit only very slightly. See Exec. Order No. 13688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451 
(Jan. 16, 2015) (blocking transfer of armored vehicles, large-caliber weapons, 
ammunition, and other heavy equipment). However, President Obama’s executive 
order was revoked by President Donald Trump. Exec. Order No. 13809, 82 Fed. Reg. 
41499 (Aug. 28, 2017). 
55 Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 6 (reporting that between the early-
1980s and mid-1990s, the percentage of cities with “police paramilitary unit[s]” 
increased by approximately thirty to thirty-eight percent). Other research indicates 
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paramilitary units is important because these units are 
frequently used to execute no-knock warrants,56 and they are 
typically armed with equipment that increases the 
confrontational nature of no-knock warrant execution and 
increases the danger inherent in the execution of such 
warrants.57  It is also not unusual for members of SWAT teams to 
wear plain clothes that fail to clearly identify them as police 
officers, further adding to homeowners’ confusion when they 
come crashing through the door.58 
D. The End of the Knock-and-Announce Requirement 
A series of United States Supreme Court cases in the 1990s 
and early 2000s played an important role in clearing the way for 
state and local law enforcement to use no-knock warrants.  In 
Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that, while the 
common law principle of announcement is an element of the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, countervailing law 
enforcement interests, such as reasonable suspicion that 
knocking and announcing would create danger for officers or 
result in the destruction of evidence, may sometimes justify an 
 
that by the mid-2000s, almost eighty percent of small towns had a SWAT team. 
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 19. 
56 See Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23; Kraska & Kappeler, supra 
note 23, at 7 (reporting that, in 1995, 75.9 percent of the activity SWAT-style units 
engaged in was drug raids, consisting almost exclusively of no-knock entries). 
57 Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 (“[T]he [Little Rock Police 
Department] is serving many of these [no-knock] warrants by using explosives that 
SWAT veterans I’ve interviewed say are reckless, dangerous and wholly 
inappropriate for use in drug raids.”); Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 3 
(noting that police paramilitary units commonly possess “an array of ‘less-than-
lethal’ technology for conducting ‘dynamic entries,’ (e.g., serving a search warrant). 
These include percussion grenades (explosive devices designed to disorient 
residents), stinger grenades (similar devices containing rubber pellets), CS and OC 
gas grenades (tear gas), and shotgun launched bean-bag systems (nylon bags of lead 
shot). ‘Dynamic entries’ require apparatuses for opening doors, including battering 
rams, hydraulic door-jamb spreaders, and C4 explosives. Some [police paramilitary 
units] purchase and incorporate a range of ‘fortified tactical vehicles,’ including 
military armored personnel carriers and specially equipped ‘tactical cruisers.’ ”). 
However, this “less-than-lethal” equipment has resulted in death, injury, and 
extensive property damage during no-knock raids. See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, 
supra note 23, at 21; Phonesavanh, supra note 49. 
58 Radley Balko, A South Carolina Anti-Drug Police Unit Admitted it Conducts 
Illegal No-Knock Raids, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/the-watch/wp/2018/05/31/a-south-carolina-anti-drug-police-unit-admitted-
it-conducts-illegal-no-knock-raids/?utm_term=.8ba8f5800596 (“The officers are 
permitted to wear what they like on raids, and often mix official gear with personal 
items, and there’s no uniformity.”). 
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unannounced entry.59  Two years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, 
the Court explicitly approved of states giving magistrates the 
authority to issue no-knock warrants.60  Before long, courts 
nationwide began relying on Richards in upholding searches 
conducted pursuant to no-knock warrants.61  And, despite the 
Court’s rejection of a blanket exception to the 
knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug 
investigations,62 no-knock warrants are, to this day, primarily 
used in drug investigations.63  Finally, in 2006, the Supreme 
Court held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence 
obtained as a result of knock-and-announce violations,64  thereby 
removing the only real insurance of police compliance with the 
knock-and-announce requirement.65 
E. The Legal Status of No-Knock Warrants Among the States 
Today 
Most states have a knock-and-announce statute on the books 
requiring that police give notice of their authority and purpose 
and be refused admittance before they may forcibly enter a 
 
59 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995). 
60 520 U.S. 385, 396 n.7 (1997) (stating that the practice of states giving 
magistrates the authority to issue no-knock warrants is reasonable when officers 
provide reasonable suspicion that entry without prior announcement would be 
appropriate). 
61 Memorandum Opinion from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y. Gen. 
Off. of Legal Couns., Re: Authority of Fed. Judges and Magistrates to Issue “No-
Knock” Warrants for the Chief Couns., Drug Enforcement Admin. 49 (June 12, 2002) 
(listing post-Richards cases upholding no-knock search warrants issued by state 
court magistrates). 
62 Richards, 520 U.S. at 395. 
63 Jessica Pishko, How A No-Knock Raid in Austin Turned Into a Lethal 
Shootout, The Appeal (Feb. 5, 2019), https://theappeal.org/how-a-no-knock-raid-in-
austin-turned-into-a-lethal-shootout/ (“No-knock raids – in which SWAT teams 
arrive with armored personnel carriers and forcefully enter a residence wearing 
body armor and using flash-bang grenades – have become a signature of the so-
called war on drugs.”); Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. See generally supra note 23. 
64 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). 
65 Id. at 609 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Without such a rule . . . police know that 
they can ignore the Constitution’s requirements without risking suppression of 
evidence discovered after an unreasonable entry.”); see also Christopher Totten & 
Sutham Cobkit, The Knock-and-Announce Rule and Police Arrests: Evaluating 
Alternative Deterrents to Exclusion for Rule Violations, 48 UNIV. OF S.F. L. REV. 71, 
102 (2013) (reporting that the majority of police chiefs perceive exclusion as having a 
substantial impact in preventing knock-and-announce violations and suggesting 
that courts may want to reconsider the role that exclusion can serve in deterring 
knock-and-announce violations). 
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residence.66  These statutes are generally modeled on the federal 
knock-and-announce statute.67  However, both state and federal 
courts generally interpret the statutory knock-and-announce 
codifications as incorporating the common law exceptions to the 
rule, including destruction of evidence and danger to officers.68  A 
small minority of state legislatures have enacted statutes 
expressly granting magistrates the authority to issue no-knock 
warrants upon reasonable suspicion that announcement would 
endanger the safety of any person or result in the destruction of 
evidence.69  In addition, because many state courts interpret their 
knock-and-announce statutes as incorporating the common law 
exceptions, many state courts have held that magistrates may 
issue no-knock warrants in the absence of explicit statutory 
authority upon an appropriate showing that exigent 
circumstances exist.70  Therefore, whether by statute or as a 
result of the common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce 
requirement, state magistrates have the authority to issue 
no-knock search warrants in a significant majority of states.71  
 
66 Garcia, supra note 32, at 691 n.39; see also Michael R. Sonnenreich & Stanley 
Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 626, 654–59 (1970) (compiling state knock-and-announce statutes). 
67 Garcia, supra note 32, at 691 n.39; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The 
officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a 
house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his 
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate 
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”) 
68 G. Todd Butler, Note, Recipe for Disaster: Analyzing the Interplay Between the 
Castle Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule after Hudson v. Michigan, 27 
MISS. C. L. REV. 435, 438 (2009). 
69 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35 (McKinney 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 29-29-01 (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1045 (West 1981); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 29-411 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3915 (2017). 
70 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982) (“[T]he 
decision whether to dispense with the requirement of announcement should be left 
to judicial officers, whenever police have sufficient information at the time of 
application for a warrant to justify such a request.”); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 
838 (Minn. 1978); State v. Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Wis. 2001) (“In 
Wisconsin, judicial officers are authorized to issue no-knock warrants.”); Poole v. 
State, 596 S.E.2d 420, 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); White v. State, 746 So. 2d 953, 956 
(Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding issuance of a no-knock warrant despite repeal of 
statute authorizing no-knock warrants because “Mississippi has no statute which 
specifically prohibits ‘no-knock’ warrants, and our case law has never prohibited the 
issuance of ‘no-knock warrants.’ ”); State v. Johnson, 775 A.2d 1273, 1278–79 (N.J. 
2001). 
71 See Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 (pointing out that 
no-knock warrants are routinely granted in a majority of states). 
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Estimates of the number of no-knock warrants issued each year 
range from 20,000 to 80,000.72 
At the time of this writing, only Oregon and Florida have 
expressly denied magistrates the authority to issue no-knock 
warrants.73  In addition to the severe risk of violence to both 
occupants and police74 and the disastrous results of the federal 
experiment with no-knock warrants,75 the Supreme Court of 
Florida noted that no-knock warrants are strongly disfavored 
because whether or not an exigency justifying a no-knock entry 
exists must necessarily be assessed on the scene at the time the 
warrant is executed.76  The Court of Appeals of Oregon expressed 
similar concerns in holding that state magistrates cannot validly 
issue no-knock warrants.77  Some states that authorize 
magistrates to issue no-knock warrants, such as Massachusetts 
and Minnesota, require officers to “make a threshold reappraisal” 
of whether the relevant exigency still exists before executing a 
no-knock warrant, and if the exigency no longer exists, the 
no-knock authorization is void.78 
 
72 See Dara Lind, Cops Do 20,000 No-Knock Raids a Year. Civilians Often Pay 
the Price When They Go Wrong., VOX (May 15, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2014/ 
10/29/7083371/swat-no-knock-raids-police-killed-civilians-dangerous-work-drugs; 
Brad Petrishen, SWAT Raids, “No-Knocks” on Rise in Frequency and Profile, 
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.telegram.com/ 
article/20150829/NEWS/150829129. 
73 OR. REV. STAT. § 133.575 (West 2018); State v. Arce, 730 P.2d 1260, 1261 n.3 
(Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that “the purported authorization in [the] warrant for a 
‘no-knock entry was necessarily void’ ” because Oregon has a statutory 
knock-and announce rule and “[a] magistrate may not authorize the police–or 
anyone else–to perform an illegal act”); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050–51 
(Fla. 1994) (“No statutory authority exists under Florida law for issuing a no-knock 
search warrant.”). In addition, the chief of the Houston Police Department in 
Houston, Texas, announced in February 2019 that the department would “largely 
end the practice of forcibly entering homes to search them without warning." Mihir 
Zaveri, Houston Police to End Use of ‘No-Knock’ Warrants After Deadly Drug Raid, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/no-knock-
warrant-houston-police.html. This announcement came after a drug raid that “might 
have been based on faulty information,” during which “two civilians were killed and 
four officers were shot[.]” Id. 
74 Bamber, 630 So.2d at 1050. 
75 Id. at 1050 n.4. 
76 Id. at 1050 (noting that circumstances may change dramatically after a 
search warrant is issued but before it is executed). 
77 Arce, 730 P.2d. at 1262 (stating that the constitutional exceptions to the 
knock-and-announce requirement necessarily depend on the circumstances existing 
at the time a warrant is executed). 
78 Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 421 (1982); State v. Lien, 265 
N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. 1978). 
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The next section of this Note will analyze the risks and 
dangers associated with the use of no-knock warrants.  Further, 
the next section will argue that, contrary to the arguments 
no-knock proponents set forth, no-knock warrants likely increase 
the danger to both civilians and law enforcement when compared 
to traditional search warrants executed in compliance with the 
common law knock-and-announce requirement. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH NO-KNOCK WARRANTS 
As previously discussed, the knock-and-announce 
requirement was historically viewed as indispensable for a 
variety of reasons, such as ensuring the safety of both 
homeowners and law enforcement personnel, avoiding property 
damage, providing homeowners with the opportunity to 
voluntarily comply with the law, allowing the homeowner to 
redirect police who are at the wrong address, and protecting the 
right to privacy.79  This section will address each of these 
concerns and argue that the best way to ensure the safety of both 
police officers and civilians, as well as to protect individuals’ civil 
liberties, is for states to eliminate the use of no-knock warrants 
and require strict adherence to the knock-and-announce 
requirement. 
A. No-Knock Warrants Fail to Truly Ensure the Safety of 
Civilians & Officers 
The danger of no-knock search warrants is best illustrated 
by a hypothetical.  Under cover of complete darkness, police 
officers dressed in dark, tactical gear and armed with 
military-grade weapons execute a no-knock search warrant by 
smashing in the front door of a private residence and charge in, 
guns raised.80  The homeowner, waking from his slumber, 
frightened, and believing the intruders are burglars or people 
wishing to harm his family, retrieves a weapon and confronts the 
intruders.  Sometimes the police fire first, sometimes the 
homeowner fires first, and sometimes the manner of entry itself 
causes injury, but too often, someone ends up wounded or dead.81  
 
79 See discussion supra Part I.A and accompanying notes. 
80 See Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20. 
81 This hypothetical is an amalgam of common elements present in the 
execution of no-knock warrants. See, e.g., Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra 
note 20; see also Kolby K. Reddish, Comment, A Clash of Doctrines: The Castle 
Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 25 WIDENER L.J. 171, 173–174 (2016). 
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Even when no one is hurt, there is usually property damage,82 
not to mention the lingering trauma that such an event can 
produce.83 
One significant reason no-knock warrants are so dangerous 
is that they clash with the castle doctrine and other defense of 
habitation statutes.84  The castle doctrine, adopted in nearly all 
fifty states, authorizes a person attacked in his or her home to 
use force in self-defense without retreating85 and creates a 
presumption that a homeowner’s use of force against intruders is 
justified to protect the homeowner’s safety.86  As noted earlier, 
magistrates also have the authority to issue no-knock warrants 
in a majority of states.87  Therefore, in many jurisdictions, state 
law simultaneously authorizes police to forcefully intrude into 
private residences without warning and allows homeowners to 
use force against a person or persons they reasonably believe to 
be unlawful intruders committing a forcible felony. 
In addition, the Second Amendment protects the right of 
individuals to keep guns in the home for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense.88  Approximately forty percent of 
Americans either currently own a gun or live with someone who 
does, and nearly two-thirds of gun owners cite personal 
protection as a major reason for owning a gun.89  The conflict 
between no-knock warrants, the castle doctrine, and the rate of 
gun ownership is a dangerous cocktail that creates an inherent 
 
82 See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 37. 
83 See Phonesavanh, supra note 49. 
84 See, e.g., Reddish, supra note 81, at 172–73; Dimitri Epstein, Note, Cops or 
Robbers? How Georgia’s Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by 
Police, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 585, 587–88 (2010); Butler, supra note 68, at 435. 
85 See Reddish, supra note 81, at 175, 177. 
86 See Butler, supra note 68, at 449. Some states, such as Florida, revoke the 
presumption of necessary force when the intruder is a police officer, even when the 
homeowner subjectively believes the person entering is an intruder. Id. at 450. 
However, Florida recognizes the presumption of necessary force when a homeowner 
uses force against an officer who violates the knock-and-announce rule. Id. As 
discussed supra Part I.D, Florida is one of two states that has thus far refused to 
authorize no-knock warrants. 
87 See supra Part I.D. 
88 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). See also John D. 
Castiglione, Another Heller Conundrum: Is It a Fourth Amendment “Exigent 
Circumstance” to Keep a Legal Firearm in Your Home?, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
230, 234 (2012); SpearIt, Firepower to the People! Gun Rights & The Law of Self-
Defense to Curb Police Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 189, 229 n.217 (2017). 
89 Kim Parker et al., The Demographics of Gun Ownership, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (June 22, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/the-demo 
graphics-of-gun-ownership/. 
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risk of harm any time police force entry into a private residence 
without first knocking and announcing their authority and 
purpose.  The principles underlying the castle doctrine, like those 
underlying the knock-and-announce rule, are based upon the 
sanctity of the home as a place where individuals should be free 
from unlawful intrusion.90  Because the knock-and-announce rule 
and the castle doctrine are based on similar legal and historical 
principles, the most harmonious way to resolve the tension 
between them and reduce the risk of violence created by 
no-knock warrants is for states to eliminate the use of no-knock 
warrants and require strict adherence to the 
knock-and-announce requirement. 
The clash between the castle doctrine and the 
knock-and-announce rule is not the only reason no-knock 
warrants are dangerous.  When executing a no-knock warrant, 
the manner of entry itself can result in injury or death to persons 
inside the house.91  This is, in part, a result of the militarization 
of America’s state and local forces, a trend that has been 
comprehensively documented by a number of scholars.92  Today, 
as a result of this trend, state and local police departments have 
near unfettered access to surplus military equipment,93 and it is 
not uncommon for police to use devices like flash-bang grenades 
while executing no-knock warrants.94  These devices, designed to 
 
90 See U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV, V; see also Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the 
Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 654, 667 
(2003) (“[S]tanding one’s ground is allowed to protect the sanctity of [the] home, 
which has been violated by someone who intends great bodily harm or death to the 
resident.”); sources cited supra note 32. 
91 See, e.g., Phonesavanh, supra note 49; Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra 
note 20; William K. Rashbaum, Woman Dies After Police Mistakenly Raid Her 
Apartment, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/17/ 
nyregion/woman-dies-after-police-mistakenly-raid-her-apartment.html. 
92 See generally, e.g., BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP, supra note 50; Cadman 
R. Kiker III, From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of American Policing 
Equipment, Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 282 passim 
(2015); Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 3–4. See also Seth W. Stoughton, 
Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
611, 641–47 (2016). The militarization trend is relevant to the no-knock warrant 
discussion because military equipment is often used during the execution of no-
knock warrants and the introduction of military culture into policing informs the 
attitude of police officers during warrant execution. See, e.g., ACLU, WAR COMES 
HOME, supra note 23, at 22–23; Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 23, at 11–14. 
93 Kiker III, supra note 92, at 287. 
94 ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 21. See also Balko, Little Rock’s 
Drug War, supra note 23 (noting that the Little Rock Police Department routinely 
served no-knock warrants by using explosives described by SWAT veterans as “a 
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disorient persons inside the home, have burned small children, 
set fire to houses, and caused fatal heart attacks.95  In addition to 
the risk of injury to persons inside, executing a no-knock warrant 
frequently involves extensive property damage, and it is unlikely 
that residents of homes damaged during no-knock entries will 
ever be reimbursed for necessary repairs.96 
Proponents of no-knock warrants argue that rapidly entering 
a residence and catching suspects by surprise is the best way to 
simultaneously ensure both the safety of officers and others and 
ensure that evidence is not destroyed.97  Others argue that the 
privacy protections afforded by strict adherence to the 
knock-and-announce requirement are “tenuous” when compared 
to the potential for destruction of evidence and public harm, 
especially in light of the growth of organized crime and drug 
trafficking.98  Moreover, proponents of no-knock warrants argue 
that knocking and announcing is a mere formality because entry 
must always be permitted after police knock and announce their 
presence.99  Finally, law enforcement officials tend to dismiss 
concerns about botched no-knock raids as isolated incidents 
rather than as examples of how dangerous the tactic is.100 
First, proponents of no-knock warrants underestimate the 
danger to both officers and civilians associated with no-knock 
 
threat to anyone inside the targeted residence,” as well as “reckless, dangerous, and 
wholly inappropriate” for drug raids and quoting a retired police officer who stated, 
“If [the suspect] had heard someone outside the door and gotten up to see who was 
there, he might well be dead.”). Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical 
Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 257 n.222 (2017) (“No-knock 
warrants, . . . are often executed using ‘dynamic entry’ tactics,” in which officers use 
specialized battering rams and explosives, such as flash-bang grenades, with the 
goal of disorienting people inside the location). 
95 Garrett and Stoughton, supra note 94 at 257 n.222. 
96 ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 21–22 (reporting that, at 
minimum, fifty percent of incidents studied involved property damage and none of 
the incident reports suggested homeowners would be reimbursed for repairs). 
97 Wesley E. Nunn, Opinion, No-Knock Warrants a Valuable Tool, ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (June 18, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/opinion/knock-
warrants-valuable-tool/Tcl4g5l8uJZgwixfhANnjJ/; Donald B. Allegro, Note, Police 
Tactics, Drug Trafficking, And Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant is an Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 552, 553 (1989). 
98 Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 66, at 647. 
99 Id. 
100 RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN 
AMERICA 51 (2006) [hereinafter BALKO, OVERKILL]. 
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entries.101  The argument that no-knock warrants ensure the 
safety of officers and civilians is strange given that history and 
precedent have repeatedly recognized the contrary assertion: 
that compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement 
protects officers by ensuring they are not mistaken for burglars 
or trespassers, and minimizes the likelihood of violent 
confrontations between homeowners and police by making 
homeowners aware of the officers’ presence.102 
In recent years, time and time again, police have frightened 
homeowners while executing no-knock warrants in the middle of 
the night with the homeowners responding violently and 
predictably.103 The way most no-knock warrants are executed 
increases the likelihood of violent confrontation, reflected in the 
growing evidence of no-knock warrants’ danger, 104 and the body 
of evidence demonstrating the danger of using no-knock warrants 
has been growing for years.105  Between 2010 and 2016, at least 
ninety-four people died during the execution of no-knock search 
warrants, thirteen of whom were police officers.106  However, the 
number is likely much higher because until 2015, no state 
required police agencies to report incidents of forced entry into 
private residences or what type of warrant was used; to date, 
only one state requires this information.107 Therefore, even 
though they are probably under-reported,108 instances of 
no-knock warrants resulting in injury or death to civilians and 
law enforcement are demonstrably not isolated incidents, and 
 
101 Id. at 63–81 (providing a non-exhaustive list of no-knock raids between 1995 
and 2006 that resulted in the injury or death of innocent bystanders or law 
enforcement officers, or both). 
102 See, e.g., McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Many home-owners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When 
a woman sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and 
climbing in, her natural impulse would be to shoot . . . [b]ut an officer seeing a gun 
being drawn on him might shoot first.”). 
103 See Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20; Reddish, supra note 81; 
Epstein, supra note 84; Butler, supra note 68 at 449–50; Kevin Sack, Murder or Self-
Defense if Officer is Killed in Raid?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/texas-no-knock-warrant-
drugs.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 
[hereinafter Sack, Murder or Self-Defense?]. 
104 BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 32. 
105 See, e.g., id. at 63–81. 
106 Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20. 
107 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. 
108 See supra Part I.A discussing the lack of laws requiring police to report how 
often no-knock warrants are used. 
2019] TO KNOCK OR NOT TO KNOCK? 221 
more importantly, it is far from clear that no-knock warrants 
actually ensure the safety of officers. 
At the same time, proponents of no-knocks overestimate the 
danger of complying with the knock-and-announce requirement 
and the necessity of no-knock warrants.109  No-knock warrants 
are primarily used in drug investigations.110  This is due, in part, 
to the fact that the general public strongly associates drugs with 
violence.111  In the context of no-knock warrants, courts presume 
officer safety is threatened in drug-related investigations.112  
Indeed, after police used a no-knock warrant against Paul 
Manafort,113 one commentator was quick to suggest that no-
knock warrants were “ ‘gratuitous’ and ‘excessive’ ” in white-
collar investigations but appropriate for “dangerous drug 
dealers” who might “meet [officers] at the door with a Glock[.]”114  
The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and expansion of police 
power that ultimately led states to authorize the use of no-knock 
warrants were based, in large part, on these kinds of 
assumptions about the relationship between guns, drugs, and 
violence.115  However, empirical support for a direct, causal 
relationship between drugs and violence is decidedly lacking.116  
Research shows that there is less violence associated with drug 
trafficking than is typically assumed.117  Moreover, the 
 
109 See generally Baradaran, supra note 21. 
110 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. One journalist laid this problem bare in 
stark terms: 
Every no-knock affidavit I reviewed included boilerplate language about 
exigent circumstances. Word for word, the detectives included the same 
verbiage about how drug dealers typically have access to guns and are 
inherently dangerous, and how the surprise tactics of a no-knock, dynamic 
entry will make it safer for the officers serving the warrant and everyone 
inside. And again, in 95 of the 103 no-knock warrants 
granted, the boilerplate language was all that the police relied upon to 
request – and receive – a no-knock warrant. 
Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23. 
111 Baradaran, supra note 21, at 235–64; see also Benjamin Levin, Guns and 
Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2200–01 (2016) (“This rhetorical link between 
drug crime and violent crime has effectively elided the distinction, practically 
rendering it moot.”). 
112 Baradaran, supra note 21, at 253 n.153, 267–68; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug 
War, supra note 23. 
113 See supra Introduction. 
114 Law Scholar says Manafort No-Knock Warrant ‘Excessive’, supra note 12. 
115 Levin, supra note 111, at 2201–02 (arguing that the perceived violence of the 
drug trade and a concern for officer safety have shaped courts’ approval of 
aggressive police practices). 
116 Baradaran, supra note 21, at 278–79. 
117 Id. at 281. 
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overwhelming majority of inmates in jail on drug charges do not 
have a violent criminal record118 and are among the least likely to 
be rearrested for a violent crime while on pretrial release.119  
Therefore, the use of no-knock warrants in drug investigations is 
based on strongly held assumptions about the violent nature of 
drug users and drug dealers rather than on actual evidence that 
such suspects are likely to be dangerous to officers.  Since no-
knock search warrants are primarily used in drug 
investigations,120 and it is not clear that they are actually 
necessary or serve the purpose their proponents claim they serve 
in that context, no-knock warrants are an unnecessary and 
dangerous tool that should be abandoned. 
Finally, while it is true that a homeowner must always 
permit police to enter after officers knock and announce their 
presence and present a valid search warrant, it is also completely 
beside the point.  The knock-and-announce requirement serves 
many purposes, all of them important.  The one purpose it 
decidedly does not serve is keeping police out of the house, as 
history and precedent have made clear.121  Knocking and 
announcing may be a mere formality, but it is a formality that 
should be respected and observed if states are serious about 
ensuring the safety of civilians and police officers and respecting 
civil liberties.  Proponents of no-knock warrants have thus failed 
to present a convincing explanation for why their continued use 
is necessary or even desirable. 
B. No-Knock Warrants & The Presumption of Innocence 
Another important principle underlying the knock-and-
announce requirement is that the suspect should be given the 
opportunity to voluntarily comply with the law.122  This principle 
is rooted in the presumption of innocence, one of the hallmarks of 
 
118 Id. at 287. 
119 Id. at 291. 
120 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 
23. 
121 See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes. Most knock-and-announce 
statutes explicitly state that an officer may force entry if he or she is refused 
admittance after providing notice of his or her authority and purpose. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window 
of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, 
if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance . . . .”). 
122 Garcia, supra note 32, at 690–91. 
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our legal system.123  No-knock warrants are necessarily based on 
the assumption that the person inside will refuse to comply with 
the search warrant, attempt to forcibly resist the officer’s entry 
into the house, attempt to escape, or attempt to destroy 
evidence.124 No-knock warrants go one step further than 
assuming that the person has incriminating evidence to destroy; 
they assume that, if the police knock and announce their 
presence, then the person will commit the additional crime of 
destroying the evidence or violently resisting the officer’s efforts 
to execute the search warrant.125 
C. Mistaken Identity, Inaccurate Information, and Insufficient 
Judicial Scrutiny 
In addition to providing an opportunity to comply with the 
law, the knock-and-announce requirement enables police to 
ensure they have the right address and, if they don’t, it gives 
residents a chance to inform the police they have the wrong 
address and redirect them before the police crash through their 
front door.126  After the Manafort raid, author and legal analyst 
Jeffrey Toobin expressed the belief that magistrate judges put 
search warrant applications under a great deal of scrutiny.127  
Senator Richard Blumenthal expressed a similar belief128 and 
further suggested that no-knock warrants are reserved for “the 
most serious criminal investigations.”129 
Unfortunately, magistrate judges give no-knock 
authorization lightly and routinely,130 sometimes when the police 
 
123 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 56 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“It need hardly be said that not every suspect is in fact guilty of 
the offense of which he is suspected, and that not everyone who is in fact guilty will 
forcibly resist arrest or attempt to escape or destroy evidence.”). 
124 See id.  
125 See id.  
126 Garcia, supra note 32, at 690–91. 
127 Balko, No-Knock Raids, supra note 14 (“Magistrate judges don’t give 
authorizations for searches of people’s homes lightly. I mean, this is a big deal.”). 
128 Leonnig et al., supra note 8 (“[A] federal judge signing this warrant would 
demand persuasive evidence of probable cause that a serious crime has been 
committed.”). Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See, e.g., Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 (finding that out of 105 
warrant requests, the Little Rock Police Department requested no-knock 
authorization in 103 and that criminal court judges granted the no-knock request in 
at least 101). Moreover, in 97 of those 105 cases, police did not provide any specific 
information for why a no-knock warrant was needed for that particular suspect. 
Radley Balko, How Little Rock’s Illegal Police Raids Validate the Exclusionary Rule, 
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officers themselves have not even requested it.131  In practice, 
“probable cause is a pretty low bar”132 and warrants are generally 
issued on something more like “possible cause” than “probable 
cause.”133  The average length of magisterial review of search 
warrant applications is approximately two minutes and 
forty-eight seconds, and some are approved in less than a 
minute.134  Federal magistrates scrutinize warrants more 
carefully than state court judges, and the most scrutinized 
warrants are in complex white-collar cases.135  Therefore, most 
no-knock warrants issued by state judges and magistrates to 
state law enforcement are likely put under much less scrutiny 
than the no-knock warrant in Manafort’s case.  Moreover, 
magistrate-shopping is a common practice because police in a 
given jurisdiction know which judges are more liberal in 
approving search warrant applications.136 
Simply put, it is much easier to get a no-knock warrant than 
many believe.  This reality helps to explain the myriad of 
 
WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/ 
2018/10/19/how-little-rocks-illegal-police-raids-validate-the-exclusionary-rule/?utm_ 
term=.38a5e1086e15 [hereinafter Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary Rule]. In 
two cases, the police cited evidence of lawful gun ownership—the suspect’s concealed 
carry permit—as evidence of that suspect’s threat to officer safety. Id. 
131 See, e.g., BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 24–25, 35 (citing a Denver 
Post study, which found that no-knock warrant requests were rubber-stamped with 
little to no scrutiny). 
132 Ken White, We Interrupt This Grand Jury Lawsplainer For a Search 
Warrant Lawsplainer, POPEHAT (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.popehat.com/2017/ 
08/09/we-interrupt-this-grand-jury-lawsplainer-for-a-search-warrant-lawsplainer/. 
133 Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-
Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 58 (2007); see 
also BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 21–25 (discussing the problem of 
“notoriously unreliable” confidential informants and providing examples of 
informant corruption). 
134 See Van Duizend et al., supra note 24; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra 
note 23; Miller & Wieber, supra note 24; Editorial, Getting a Warrant, supra note 24. 
135 White, supra note 132. 
136  See Van Duizend et al., supra note 24, at 104-05 (“Judge shopping is 
practiced by search warrant applicants . . . . Again, the extent of the problem varies, 
but when the procedures permit selection of the magistrate who will review a 
warrant, judge-shopping occurs.”). Moreover, the authors of that report note that 
“police supervisory personnel frequently review warrant applications before they rae 
presented to a magistrate[,]” and that “[t]he intensity of this preliminary 
involvement varies, in much the same way as the magisterial review itself, from a 
eprfunctory review to actual drafting of the affidavit.” Id. at 50. Finally, the authors 
indicate that they “heard complaints that inexperienced assistant prosecutors who 
know comparatively little about the law concerning search warrants are assigned to 
conduct the reviews, resulting in “prosecutor shopping.” Id. at 51. 
2019] TO KNOCK OR NOT TO KNOCK? 225 
examples of no-knock warrants executed at the wrong address,137 
or executed at the right address, only for police to learn that their 
information was bad and the person they were looking for moved 
out long ago.138  Nor are no-knock search warrants confined to the 
most serious criminal investigations.  In fact, the majority of 
them are issued in connection with routine, low-level drug 
investigations.139  That no-knock warrants are put under 
insufficient judicial scrutiny is also evidenced by the nearly 
one-third of investigations that turn up minimal quantities of 
drugs or none at all.140  This suggests that no-knock warrants are 
regularly used in cases that are far from even the most serious 
drug investigations, let alone the most serious criminal 
investigations generally.  Even when no-knock warrants are 
executed at the correct address and against the correct target, 
their use is hard to justify because of the high risk of danger to 
the suspect, to police officers themselves, and to any other 
innocent third-parties in the house or nearby.141  That they are 
subjected to insufficient judicial scrutiny and are often executed 
at the wrong address or based on flawed information further 
solidifies the argument that no-knock warrants have no 
legitimate place in law enforcement. 
 
137 BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 43–63. 
138 See, e.g., Phonesavanh, supra note 49; McKinley Jr., supra note 2. 
139 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38. A particularly damning review of Little 
Rock’s use of no-knock warrants highlights this: 
Of the 105 warrants I reviewed, the police claimed to have found some 
quantity of illicit drugs in 85, leaving 20 raids that turned up no 
contraband at all. But even among those 85, they rarely found a significant 
quantity of the drug they claimed their informant had purchased. In some, 
they claimed to have found “residue” of a “powder” or “leafy substance,” but 
it isn’t clear whether those substances were ever tested. In others they 
claimed to have found a “pill bottle” or “pills,” without always revealing 
what the pills were, or whether the owner had a prescription for them. In 
35 of the 105 no-knock raids, the police only had probable cause to search 
for marijuana. In eight others, they found only marijuana despite obtaining 
a search warrant for harder drugs. 
Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23. 
140 ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 34. 
141 See BALKO, OVERKILL, supra note 100, at 63–71; Balko, Little Rock’s Drug 
War, supra note 23 (“There were two 6-year-olds and a 13-year-old in that house, 
along with my mother, who’s paralyzed from the waist down. They blew the front 
and back doors right off the wall. And I don’t mean they blew the door open. I mean 
there was no door left.”). 
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D. No-Knock Warrants & Race 
There is a large and growing body of scholarship detailing 
the disproportionate impact of the criminal justice system on 
people of color.142  No-knock warrants appear to be no different in 
that there is evidence that they are used disproportionately 
against people of color.143  As one victim of a no-knock raid gone 
wrong put it, “This is about race.  You don’t see SWAT teams 
going into a white-collar community, throwing grenades into 
their homes.”144 
As previously discussed, no-knock warrants began primarily 
as, and remain, a tool of the War on Drugs.145  Viewed in this 
light, it is not especially surprising that no-knock warrants are 
disproportionately used against suspects of color because the War 
on Drugs, from its inception, has disproportionately impacted 
people and communities of color.146  This has long been an open 
secret.147  The disproportionate use of no-knock warrants against 
people of color means that minority communities bear the brunt 
of the death and property destruction associated with no-knock 
raids.148  Especially in communities where relationships between 
 
142 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (revised ed. 2012); 
PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017); JAMES FORMAN JR., 
LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017); MATT TAIBBI, I CAN’T BREATHE: A KILLING ON BAY 
STREET (2017). 
143 See Balko, Little Rock’s Drug War, supra note 23 (“Nearly all the people 
raided that I spoke to were lower-income, and all but one were black. Of the 105 
warrants I reviewed, 84 were for black suspects, 16 were for white and five were for 
Latinos. Little Rock as a whole is 46 percent white and 42 percent black. Hispanics 
and Latinos of any race make up just under 7 percent of the population.”); ACLU, 
WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 35 (“According to the records that did contain 
race information, SWAT team deployment primarily impacted people of color.”). 
144 ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 23, at 14 (quoting Alecia 
Phonesavanh, whose nineteen-month-old baby was severely injured by a flash-bang 
grenade during a no-knock raid). 
145 Supra Part I.C. 
146 See Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or 
Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 382 
(2002) (arguing that African-Americans, and African-American males in particular, 
are the primary target of the government’s War on Drugs); see also Erik Luna, Drug 
War and Peace, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 833–37 (2016); Kimberly D. Bailey, 
Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 
1551–52 (2014). 
147 Nixon’s chief domestic policy advisor openly acknowledged that the 
administration “knew [they] couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or 
black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks 
with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, [they] could disrupt those 
communities.” ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 133 (2017). 
148 Nunn, supra note 146, at 404. 
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police and civilians are already strained, the use of no-knock 
warrants can create further tensions and give off the impression 
that police are something akin to a military occupational force.149  
There is also some evidence, albeit anecdotal, that black and 
white suspects who use weapons in self-defense during no-knock 
raids are treated differently by the legal system.150 
To be sure, prohibiting no-knock warrant use will not solve 
the many other race-based problems associated with drug 
enforcement specifically and the criminal justice system more 
generally.  However, recognizing that no-knock warrants 
disproportionately impact people of color is important to a 
comprehensive understanding of why no-knock warrants are 
uniquely problematic. 
III. A NEW DIRECTION: LEGISLATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE  
NO-KNOCK WARRANT PROBLEM 
First, state legislatures should enact laws expressly 
prohibiting state magistrates from issuing no-knock warrants.  
Anything short of this, such as the Utah legislation eliminating 
no-knock warrants in drug possession cases,151 is a half-measure.  
Two states, Florida and Oregon, already completely prohibit the 
use of no-knock warrants.152  It is clear that no-knock warrants 
are a tool fraught with inherent danger153 and, if states are 
serious about ensuring the safety of both civilians and police 
officers, are a tool that should be abandoned entirely.   A return 
to the time-tested knock-and-announce requirement is the most 
meaningful way to accomplish these goals.  Of course, proponents 
of no-knock warrants argue that they ensure officer safety.154 
However, the reality is that although no-knock warrants are a 
relatively recent development,155 the danger associated with their 
use is already apparent.156  The knock-and-announce 
requirement, which is also meant to ensure officer safety, has 
 
149 Id. 
150 See Sack, Murder or Self-Defense?, supra note 103 (describing the divergent 
stories of two suspects, one black and one white, who shot at and killed police 
officers during no-knock raids and whose cases played out very differently). 
151 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210(8) (West 2015). 
152 See relevant discussion supra Part I.E and accompanying notes. 
153 See Part II.A. 
154 Nunn, supra note 97; Allegro, supra note 97. 
155 See supra Parts I.C, I.D, & I.E. 
156 Supra Part II.A. 
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demonstrated its value and importance over several centuries.157  
Moreover, ending the use of no-knock warrants does not 
necessarily preclude police from making an unannounced entry 
when they determine on the scene that an appropriate exigency 
exists.158 The on-the-scene assessment of circumstances is critical 
for police to determine if changed circumstances have obviated 
the need for a no-knock entry or suggest that a no-knock entry is 
unwise; however, in practice, police do not always make an 
on-the-scene assessment once they have obtained a no-knock 
warrant.159  Eliminating the use of no-knock warrants, in 
connection with the two other legislative proposals discussed 
below, would ensure that police perform a complete, thorough 
assessment of the situation when they arrive on scene to execute 
a search warrant before deciding whether to dispense with 
knocking and announcing their presence. 
Second, states should enact legislation requiring execution of 
traditional search warrants during daylight hours, roughly 
defined as between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.160  It is relatively common 
to execute traditional knock-and-announce search warrants at 
night.161  Serving traditional knock-and-announce warrants in 
the middle of the night undermines the entire purpose of the 
knock-and-announce requirement because it is unlikely that a 
person who is asleep will be able to wake up, get out of bed, and 
reach the front door in the very short amount of time that elapses 
before police force entry.162  In order for the knock-and-announce 
requirement to serve the purposes it was historically meant to 
serve, persons inside the home must have a real, meaningful 
opportunity to answer the door and comply with the lawful 
execution of the search warrant.  The most effective way to 
 
157 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 605–06 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 623 (noting that even without a no-knock warrant, police retain the 
authority to exercise their independent judgment regarding the wisdom of carrying 
out a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is executed); see also supra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
159 Phonesavanh, supra note 49; Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 
(police claimed not to have any evidence that children were in the house despite the 
presence of children’s toys on the front lawn at the scene, suggesting police did not 
conduct any on-site review of the situation before executing the warrant). 
160 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(2)(B) (defining “daytime” as between 6:00 a.m. 
and 10:00 p.m. local time). 
161 Balko, Utah Data, supra note 38 (reporting that in Utah, 18.1% of search 
warrants executed by SWAT teams were knock-and-announce raids at night). 
162 Id.; see also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38–39 (2003) (finding that 
forcing entry fifteen to twenty seconds after knocking and announcing was 
constitutionally reasonable). 
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guarantee that residents have such an opportunity is to require 
execution of all search warrants during daylight hours.  This is 
when people are more likely to be both awake and able to get to 
the door, or out of the house altogether, substantially reducing 
the risk of a confrontation.  Moreover, there is evidence that 
police typically comply with the warrant instructions when a 
judge signs off on a warrant requiring service during daytime 
hours.163 
Finally, in order to ensure meaningful compliance with the 
knock-and-announce requirement, state courts should apply the 
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through 
knock-and-announce violations under their state constitutions, as 
a few state courts have already done.164  In reaching its 
conclusion that suppression is not necessary in cases of 
knock-and-announce violations, the United States Supreme 
Court grossly underestimated the historical and practical 
importance of the knock-and-announce requirement and the 
purposes it serves.165  These interests are far from 
inconsequential, and as recent history has made clear, no-knock 
warrants come with a significant risk to the safety of both police 
officers and persons inside the house,166 not to mention people 
nearby who might be caught in the crossfire or hit by stray 
bullets.167  In order to ensure meaningful compliance with the 
knock-and-announce rule, application of the exclusionary rule to 
evidence obtained through knock-and-announce violations is 
essential.168  State courts can provide greater constitutional 
 
163 Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 130 (“[O]f the 80 
instances in which a judge instructed Little Rock police to serve the warrant during 
the day, the officers complied with those instructions.”). 
164 See, e.g., State v. Jean-Paul, 295 P.3d 1072, 1077 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013); 
Berumen v. State, 182 P.3d 635, 637 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008), State v. Robinson, 944 
A.2d 718, 720–21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 974 A.2d 
1057 (2009) (holding that suppression of evidence is the appropriate remedy for 
violation of the knock-and-announce requirement under the respective state 
constitutions). 
165 Supra notes 41–45 and accompanying discussion. See also Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 620–22 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
166 Supra Part II. A. 
167 Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids, supra note 20 (“Stray bullets have whizzed 
through neighboring homes, and in dozens of instances the victims of police gunfire 
have included the family dog.”). 
168 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 629 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is 
common sense that “without suppression there is little to deter knock-and-announce 
violations”); see also id. at 621 (arguing that failure to comply with the knock-and-
announce rule renders a search unlawful and unlawful searches require suppression 
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protections for their citizens under their state constitutions than 
the federal Constitution requires, and state courts should take 
advantage of this power with regard to knock-and-announce 
violations. 
Opponents of applying the exclusionary rule to 
knock-and-announce violations argue that alternatives to 
suppression, such as civil lawsuits, internal police discipline, and 
citizen review boards, are sufficient to deter knock-and-announce 
violations.169  However, available data and experience suggest 
that these alternate remedies are grossly insufficient,170 and that 
the exclusionary rule is the most effective way to deter police 
misconduct.171  Of course, there is a social cost that comes with 
suppressing evidence, but the social cost is no greater in the 
knock-and-announce context than when the exclusionary rule is 
applied to other Fourth Amendment violations.172  The deterrent 
value of exclusion outweighs the social cost of fewer convictions 
because of the very real risk to the safety of both police and 
civilians associated with no-knock entries.  Therefore, to ensure 
meaningful compliance with the knock-and-announce 
requirement and deter violations, application of the exclusionary 
rule to knock-and-announce violations is indispensable. 
Taken together, these three proposals provide a more 
comprehensive framework to end the use of no-knock warrants 
and usher in a return to strict compliance with the 
knock-and-announce requirement than current efforts to reform 
no-knock warrant use. 
 
of the evidence obtained as a result); Balko, Little Rock and the Exclusionary Rule, 
supra note 130 (arguing that application of the exclusionary rule to evidence 
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CONCLUSION 
“It would have been a lot easier if someone would have 
announced themselves, man,” said Marvin Guy, who is awaiting 
trial on capital murder and attempted capital murder charges for 
shooting at police executing a no-knock warrant because he 
believed he was being robbed.173  In response, an officer explained 
to him that the purpose of no-knock entries is ensuring officer 
safety.174  This disconnect cuts to the heart of the problem with 
no-knock warrants.  Actors on both sides—the unsuspecting 
homeowner and police officers—believe their own safety is in 
danger.  Although no-knock warrants are purportedly justified by 
concerns about officer safety, in practice, they create a 
substantial risk of violent confrontation between homeowners 
and law enforcement officers.  No-knock warrants have already 
taken a substantial toll and the remedies states have proposed 
and adopted to date are insufficient.  It is therefore imperative 
that states act to eliminate their use and shepherd a return to 
strict compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement. 
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